In the present paper, syntax and semantics will be presented for an expansion of ordinary n-agent QML with constant domain, non-rigid constants, rigid variables and including both functions, relations, and equality. Further, the number of agents will be specified axiomatically thus ensuring maximal flexibility wrt. the cardinality of the set of agents. Domain, variables, and constants will be partitioned in an agent-part and an object-part and the syntax will be expanded to include strings of the type ∀xKxφ as wff's of the language. This will enhance expressiveness regarding the epistemic status of agents. Such a term-modal version of the logic K is shown to be sound and complete wrt. the class of (appropriate) frames, and a term-version of S4 is shown to be sound and complete wrt. the class of (appropriate) frames in which the relations are transitive. It should be noted that completeness is shown via the framework of canonical models and thus allows for non-complicated generalizations to other logics than the term-versions of K and S4.
Introduction
In a passage of [2] Descartes reflects on what can be known and famously concludes that "I think, therefore I am". As the insight presented in "the cogito" has a central place in classic epistemology it is of natural interest for the student of formal epistemology to answer the question of how such a "quote" might be formalized. What is noticeable is the reflexive nature of the cogito, i.e. the fact that it deals with an agent's reflections on itself. One might go about formalizing the cogito in some epistemic modal logic: Propositional modal logic, represented by the Backus-Naur form, is given as P ::= ¬P | P → Q | K i P and to express the sentiment of the cogito we would have to device propositional formulas P 1 , ..., P n and interpret P i as "agent i is". Under this ascription, K i P i reads "agent i knows that she is", and the question then becomes how to formalize "I think". A natural choice would be K i φ for some tautology φ, since for instance any thinking being ought to "know" e.g. p ∨ ¬p, and anyone knowing such a thing is certainly a thinking being. The cogito then, would amount to K i (p∨¬p) → K i P i , the K i 's being modal operators, and the index set in one-toone correspondence with some fitting set of agents. Three things are noteworthy; first, in order to express the cogito for a set of agents one would have to do so rather crudely by conjunction and secondly, any relation between "agent i" and the subscript of the modal operator has to be stated in meta-language, i.e. the agents are nowhere to be seen in the semantics and thirdly, dealing with propositional logic there is no intra-logical connection between the entities of which the propositions speak and the semantics. The situation is slightly better in standard first-order modal logic due to the enhanced expressivity that comes with the introduction of quantifiers and relations; represented by its BackusNaur form standard first-order modal logic yields the following syntax:
φ ::= R(t 1 , ..., t n ) | ¬φ|φ → ψ | ∀xφ|K i φ where R is an n -ary relation symbol, and all the t i 's are terms 1 . In this language, the sentence "agent i knows that she is" is formalized along the lines of ∃xK i (x = α), assuming that a constants α for each agent, and the cogito would amount to something along the lines of K i (φ ∨ ¬φ) → ∃xK i (x = α). What is important to notice is that in ordinary first-order n -agent modal logic we have to state the relation between the subscript i of the modal operator and the referent of α in meta-language, i.e. it is not built-in in the semantics when "quantifying" over agents by means of the conjunction. What we really want is the ability to state ∀y K y (φ ∨ ¬φ) → ∃xK y (x = y) for some agentdesignating variable y, i.e. we want modal operators indexed by terms, we want the ability to distinguish between those terms that are appropriate for modal indexation and those that are not, and we want the agents back in the domain! In Hintikka's landmark 1962 book "Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions" he lays the foundation of what is today called epistemic logic. In this context he discusses syntax for formulas of the form K α P for some individual constant α, and writes in a footnote:
"Strictly speaking, we ought to distinguish those free individual symbols which can only take names of persons as their substitutionvalues and which can therefore serve as subscripts of epistemic operators from those which cannot do so." [3, pp. 11] Nevertheless, Hintikka does not present either syntax or semantics for such a logic, which is what will be accomplished here. The purpose of the present paper is thus to first state syntax and semantics for a two-sorted term-modal logic with constant domain, non-rigid constants, and equality and secondly to state and prove soundness and completeness. As such the aim is simply for me to hone my technical skills by treating a logic somewhat more complex than what is normally encountered on undergraduate level. The following is a merge between the exposition of a term-modal logic in [5] and the exposition of a many-sorted modal logic in [6] . To remain true to the epistemic interpretation and for notational convenience I remain two-sorted even though the generalization to general many-sorted logic is straightforward. The interested reader is encouraged to do the proper adjustments in order to obtain the many-sorted version of the logic presented here. First, language and syntax for a language for a two-sorted term-modal logic is stated in section 2. Then, in section 3 we present semantics including frames, interpretations, models and valuations leading up to the notions of truth and validity in 3.1 and 3.2. In section 4 we turn to an axiomatic system for the logic, and in 5 a couple of useful results are proved as preparation for a proof of soundness in section 6. Sections 7 and 8 contains the bulk of the work in this paper, namely completeness results for the two-sorted term-modal versions of K and S4, and section 9 relates the results to Hintikka's thoughts on the axiom 4 as presented in [3] . As the completeness proof is lengthy and technical we present a quick overview here meant to ease the acquisition.
A Brief Survey of the Proof of Completeness
The key insight regarding the overall proof strategy is contained in Proposition 2 which states the following: Showing completeness essentially amounts to, given a consistent set of formulas, constructing an appropriate model satisfying this set of formulas. The next part of the completeness proof thus consists of constructing this model starting with the worlds of the model, which we choose to be a fitting maximally consistent set of formulas. Lindenbaum's Lemma (Lemma 7) and the Saturation Lemma (Lemma 8) ensures that it is possible to extend a given set of formulas to a maximally consistent set, and Lemma 6 then states some crucial properties of such maximally consistent sets. Definition 25 then presents the canonical model, and Propositions 4, 5, and 6 are technical results ensuring that the canonical model is well-defined and stands in appropriate relations to the semantics of the logical connectives. Having defined the worlds of the canonical model as sets of formulas the idea is that a world should satisfy all and only those formulas which enjoy membership in this particular world, and that the construction actually has this feature is the content of the Truth Lemma (Lemma 9). With the Truth Lemma in hand the canonical class Theorem (Theorem 2) is stated and proved, the consequence of which is that any appropriate logic is complete wrt. the class of canonical models. As an application of the above, completeness of the "term-modal" version of S4 is proven in Theorem 3.
2 The Language L σ
T M and Syntax
Fix an agent-set A = {α 1 ...α n } at the outset. In this section we add these agents to the domain of quantification resulting in a two-sorted term-modal logic. The two sorts will correspond to agents and objects respectively, and "term" refers to the ability to quantify over indexes in modal operators thus enhancing the ability to express agents reflecting reflexively about themselves and other agents. In this section language and syntax for a two-sorted term-modal logic with constant domain, non-rigid constants, and equality is defined. We start with the syntax. It is worth noting that the language is not parametrized by the agent-set -rather the number of agents is specified axiomatically 2 . Throughout, if v = (x 1 , ..., x n ) is a vector, denote by v i the i'th element i.e v i = x i .
Please note that the remaining logical connectives are defined in the ordinary way while the existential quantifier ∃ and the modal operators P t are defined as duals of ∀ and K t respectively -this is also completely standard.
Before moving on we define the notion of a free variable. For the most part it is completely standard but for the set K of modal operators something new is going on. Any occurring variable not free is referred to as bound. Furthermore, any formula without any free variables is called a sentence. Where φ is a formula, t is a term, and x a variable we denote by φ(t/x) the result of substituting any free occurrence of x for t, demanding that no free variable of t becomes bound by doing so 4 .
This concludes the syntactic definitions, which do not differ much from the syntax of standard many-sorted modal logic as presented in e.g. in [6] . The new part is that we can quantify over indexes for modal operators, that is expressions of the type ∀xK x φ are now wffs of the language. Of course such syntactic addons are in need of a semantic counterpart; thus turning to semantics we put the agents A back in the domain!
Semantics
Before moving on one bit of notation is needed. Where A and B are sets, take A∪B to mean the disjoint union of A and B.
T M is a triple F := W, R, DOM where 1. W is a non-empty set of worlds, and 4 What then do we take φ(t/x) to mean, if in fact some free variable in t does become bound by the substitution? We simply substitute φ for an appropriate alphabetic variant which is always possible. See [4] pp. 241.
2. R is a map associating binary accessibility relations on W to each agent, that is R : A → P(W × W), and 3. DOM = DOM agt∪ DOM obj is the domain of quantification, where neither of the cojoints are empty and DOM agt = A.
Take R i to mean R(α i ) and write wR i w ′ whenever w, w ′ ∈ W are such that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(α i ).
Next up is the notion of an interpretation but before bringing the technical definition a few comments are in order. We are currently defining a logic with non-rigid functions, relations, and constants which is naturally reflected in the definition above. Also, as we now have to take care what sort of term goes into each place of functions and relations the notion of arity is slighty more complex than the ordinary natural number cf. Definition 1.
Definition 6.
[Interpretation] An interpretation I is a map such that simultaneously
)|d ∈ DOM } for every w ∈ W, and 4. For each σ ∈ σ let I :
Definition 7.
[Model] The two-tuple F , I consisting of a frame and an interpretation is called a model and we write M = F , I . In this case we say that M is based on F .
Having dealt with relation symbols, function symbols, equality and constants the only remaining task is to interpret free variables. For this we need a valuation:
For technical reasons we need one more definition before we turn to truth. Namely, we need the notion of an x-variant to deal with formulas involving ∀.
′ of a valuation v is a valuation such that v ′ and v agrees on all variables except possibly for x. We note that any valuation is an x -variant of itself.
For brevity we shall write t w,v for the extension of the term t at world w under valuation v, that is:
It is useful to note that for any agent-referring term t the composite R(t w,v ) denotes an accessibility relation in R.
Truth
Definition 10. [Truth for non-modal formulas] Let M = W, R, DOM, I be a model, w ∈ W, and v a valuation. We define truth in the model M at w ∈ W for the formula φ ∈ L σ T M inductively by:
2 , and 3. M, w |= v ¬φ iff it is not the case that M, w |= v φ, and
And we notice that whenever φ is a sentence we can omit explicit mentioning of the valuation and simply write M, w |= φ. T M , and t an agent-referring term. We define truth in the model M at w for modal formulas inductively by:
Validity
Above we defined the most basic notion of truth namely that of truth in a world of a model under a given valuation. As the aim of the project is to state and prove completeness, it shall be of paramount importance for us to be able to distinguish truth at different levels. As we shall see later the notion of satisfiability will play a key role in proving completeness.
Definition 12.
[Validity and Satisfiability] A formula φ is satisfiable if there exists a model M, a world w and a valuation v such that M, w |= v φ. Further, if φ is such that M, w |= v φ for all valuations we say that φ is valid at world w, and we write M, w |= φ. We say that a formula φ is valid in the model M if M, w |= φ for all w ∈ W and we write M |= φ. If a formula φ is valid in all models based on a frame F we say that φ is valid in F and we write F |= φ. We say that a formula φ is valid on the class F of frames if F |= φ for all F ∈ F and we write this F |= φ. If φ is valid on the class of all frames we simply say that φ is valid and write |= φ.
Please recall that we require formulas to be finite. Yet, sometimes we wish to speak about infinite strings of symbols so it is advantageous for us to introduce a bit of notation to deal with this. So, whenever Γ is an arbitrarily large set of formulas we write M, w |= v Γ, M, w |= Γ and so forth to mean the obvious. We ask the reader to also note that whenever S is a class of models a model from S simply means some model M for which M ∈ S, while if F is a class of frames a model from F is a model based on some frame F ∈ F , that is M = F , I for some interpretation I. I shall write M ∈ F for a model based on some frame F ∈ F , and write that M is a model from F . We are now in position to define the semantic consequence relation:
Definition 13. [Semantic Consequence] Let φ be a formula, Γ be a set of formulas, and S a class of structures (either models or frames). We say that φ is a semantic consequence of Γ and write Γ |= S φ if it holds in all models M from S, for all valuations v and all worlds w of
Having defined the semantic consequence relation we are in position to clarify the notion of a semantically specified logic: Definition 14. [Semantically Specified Logic] Given a language L, and a class S of structures (either models or frames) formulated in L, we define the logic L S := {φ | |= S φ}.
We proceed directly to the first Proposition of the project. 
Proof. Seeing that the only leeway after fixing model and world is the interpretation of free variables via the valuation, and φ(y/x) differs only from φ in that φ(y/x) has a free occurrence of y everywhere that φ has a free occurrence of x, and v and v ′ agrees everywhere except for x where v(x) = v ′ (y) the Proposition follows.
Having established a thorough semantic description of the two-sorted termmodal logic we now aim to provide the proof-theoretical counterpart; indeed the overall purpose of the project is to show that these two descriptions amount to the same thing. As such we now turn to the axioms.
An Axiomatic System of K T M

A,σ
In this section we define the two-sorted term-modal logic version of the concept of normal logics. We will denote the resulting logic for n agents over the language A,σ -proof before we are ready to define normality in the new setting. The section concludes with three Propositions that shall be of help to us when proving completeness later on.
Axiom Schemas of
First of all, we let all substitution instances of valid formulas from Propositional modal logics be axioms of K T M A,σ 6 . Furthermore, we add the following axiom schemas:
Let φ ∈ L σ T M be any formula and y any variable free in φ. Then every instance of
is an axiom. Further, for any term t
are axioms. Also, in order to accommodate the partition of terms in sorts we include for each x ∈ V AR agt and y ∈ V AR obj the axiom
Dealing with a language including equality we also add the Principle of Substitutivity such that for any variables x, y and any formula φ we have
as an axiom 7 . We note that as variables are rigid the stated version of PS should be of no concern. We also add Existence of Identicals, such that for any constant c
is an axiom. For technical reasons we also need to make sure that the agentpart of the domain always contain the appropriate number of element. So, for any x 1 , ...x |A| , y ∈ V AR agt we have as an axiom:
We further include a version of the axiom K, such that for any agentreferring term t and any formulas φ and ψ we have
as an axiom of the system K T M A,σ too. We also choose to add the Barcan Formula for interplay between quantifiers and modal operators such that for any agent-referring term t and any variable x = t we have the axiom
and lastly; for any variables x and y, and any agent-referring term t we add the axiom Knowledge of Non-identity:
And we note that the axiom Dual is unnecessary since we have simply defined the operator P t such that P t := ¬K t ¬.
Inference Rules of K T M
A,σ
The strategy when defining a logic in a syntactical matter is to first state a set Λ of axioms and then to close it off under rules of inference such that the resulting logic can be defined as Λ 8 by a slight abuse of notation. First, we choose to include modus ponens. That is for any formulas φ and ψ ϕ, ϕ → ψ ψ
is a valid inference. Also, we include Knowledge Generalization among our rules of inference such that for every agent-referring term t we have
as a valid inference. Finally, if φ is without free occurrences of x we let
Having established axioms and rules of inference we are ready to define the notion of a
A,σ -axiom or the result of using some rule of inference on one or more earlier formulas of the sequence. If φ is a formula we say that φ is K T M A,σ -provable if it is the last element in such a sequence and we write ⊢ KT M A,σ φ.
Note that at this point we know nothing about the relation between truth as defined in definitions 10 and 11 on the one side and provability as just defined on the other. It will be the aim of this project to establish the appropriate equivalence! Three more concepts shall be defined here before turning to a couple of handy results -which will also yield an opportunity to see
-proofs in action.
Definition 16.
[Normality] A normal n -agent two-sorted term-modal logic Λ is any set of L σ T M -formulas containing all of the above axioms closed under all of the above rules of inference.
Whenever φ ∈ Λ we say that φ is a Theorem of Λ, and write ⊢ Λ φ. If Λ 1 and Λ 2 are two logics such that Λ 1 ⊆ Λ 2 we say that Λ 2 is an extension of Λ 1 .
Definition 17. [Λ -deducibility] Let Γ be any set of wffs of the language, φ be any formula, and Λ a logic. Then φ is Γ -deducible from Λ if there exist a finite subset Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that
Whenever this obtains, write
Definition 18. [Λ -consistency] Let Γ be any set of wffs of the language. We say that Γ is Λ -consistent if for all formulas φ we have
and Λ -inconsistent otherwise. Please note that if some arbitrary set of wffs Γ is inconsistent then there has to exist Γ 0 ⊆ Γ finite which is incomplete since proofs are finite by definition.
Having defined the framework we end this section by the proof-theoretical counterpart to definition 14:
If L is a language, and K denote a set of axioms together with some rules of inference formulated in L, we define the logic L K := {φ | ⊢ K φ}. Now, we can express completeness as the inclusion L S ⊆ L K and soundness as L K ⊆ L S . We proceed to state and prove some Lemmas that shall be of great use during the proof of completeness.
A Couple of Handy Lemmas
Lemma 1. Let x, y ∈ V AR and t ∈ T erm agt . Then
Proof. Let φ(z) = K t (x = z) for any t ∈ T erm agt . Then we have by Propositional calculus that
. Using the Theorem from Propositional calculus that
, and so an application of MP yields the desired result.
In the following the formula
will be called Knowledge of Identity.
Lemma 2. Let t ∈ T erm agt , and φ 1 , ..., φ n be wffs of the language. Then the following holds
will be called K-Distribution.
Proof. We omit the proof as it is fairly standard. See [4] pp. 28.
Lemma 3. Let φ and ψ be wffs of the language, and t ∈ T erm agt . Then it holds that
By KG we obtain ⊢ KT M A,σ K t φ → ψ and thus K yields the desired result.
The last Lemma to be proven here is a small result that is simply practical to have at hand.
Lemma 4.
[Consistency Lemma] Let Γ be any Λ -consistent set of formulas, and φ any formula. Then either is Γ ∪ {φ} consistent or Γ ∪ {¬φ} is.
Proof. Assume that Γ ∪ {φ} is inconsistent. As Γ is consistent this means that Γ ⊢ Λ ¬φ but then the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent.
We are now ready to undertake the work of showing soundness, i.e that any Theorem of our logic is valid wrt. the class of all T M σ A -frames, or equivalently containment of the logic specified via syntax in the logic we have specified semantically.
Soundness
We start by the central definition:
Definition 20.
[Soundness] Let S be a class of structures (either models or frames), and let Λ be a logic. We say that Λ is sound wrt. S if for every formula φ of the language we have if ⊢ Λ φ then |= S φ.
And we go about showing soundness for K T M
A,σ wrt. the class F of all T M σ Aframes in two steps: First we show that all axioms are valid, and then we show that validity is preserved by each of the rules of inference.
Validity of Axioms
We have to show that all of the axioms ∀, Id, PS,∃Id, N, K, BF, and KNI are valid. In the following let F = W, DOM, R .
∀ : We have to show that |= F ∀xφ → φ(y/x) where x, y ∈ V AR and y has only free occurrences in φ so assume M, w |= v ∀xφ for arbitrary M ∈ F , w ∈ W, and v a valuation. Let v ′ be an x -variant of v such that v(x) = v ′ (y) such that we have M, w |= v ′ φ by the semantics for ∀. By Proposition 1 we obtain M, w |= v φ(y/x), and as M, w and v was arbitrary this yields the validity of the axiom ∀ with respect to F .
Id:
We have to show that where t is any term we have |= F (t = t), but this is immediately clear from the semantics of =.
MSC: By the semantics of = and the definition of the valuation MSC is trivially valid.
PS:
We have to show that where x and y are variables and φ any wff we have |= F (x = y) → φ(x) → φ(y) , which will be accomplished by induction on the complexity of φ. Assume M, w |= v (x = y) and M, w |= v φ(x) for arbitrary M ∈ F , w ∈ W and valuation v. By the semantics for = we immediately get v(x) = v(y) and thus if φ is atomic |= v φ(y) follows readily. This establishes the induction base. Assume now that we have the result for ψ and wish to show PS for¬ψ. If M, w |= v (x = y) we get by the induction hypothesis that |= v ¬ψ(x) ↔ ¬ψ(y) and as we by assumption have that |= v ¬ψ(x) it yields a contradiction if |= v ψ(y). As M, w and v was arbitrary we conclude that PS holds for ¬ψ.
If we know PS for formulas φ and ψ we show that it holds for φ → ψ, so assume M, w |= v (x = y) and M, w |= v φ(x) → ψ(x) . Now, either M, w |= v ¬φ(x) or M, w |= v ψ(x) by the semantics for →, but since PS holds for ¬φ and ψ by the previous and the induction hypothesis this means that either M, w |= v ¬φ(y) or M, w |= v ψ(y) which in turn implies M, w |= v φ(y) → ψ(y). As M, w and v was arbitrary we conclude validity of PS for φ → ψ.
If we assume PS for φ it vacously follows that PS holds for ∀xφ so we turn to the modal case.
Assume
N: This is simply true by construction. The axiom says that there are exactly |A| = n elements which are quantified over using variables from V AR agt , but this is precisely the content of definition 5 3.
K:
We have to show that for any M ∈ F , w ∈ W, valuation v, agent-denoting term t, and wffs φ and ψ we have M,
All in all, we either have M, w ′ |= v ψ for all w ′ ∈ W with the property that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(t w,v ) in which case it holds that M, w |= v K t φ, or we have for some such w ′ that M, w ′ |= v ¬φ in which case M, w |= v ¬K t φ. By the semantics of → we conclude M, w |= v K t φ → K t ψ which was what we wanted.
BF:
We need to show that for any M ∈ F , w ∈ W, valuation v, agent-denoting term t, variable x = t, and wff φ we have M, w |= v ∀xK t φ → K t ∀xφ. Assume for contradiction that M, w |= v ∀xK t φ yet M, w |= v ¬K t ∀xφ. By the latter there is some world w ′ for which (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(t w,v ) such that M, w ′ |= v ¬∀xφ which in turn means that there is v ′ an x -variant of v such that M, w ′ |= v ′ ¬φ. However, by the former we get that M, w |= v ′ K t φ and thus M, w ′ |= v ′ φ, yielding a contradiction.
KNI:
We have to prove that for any M ∈ F , w ∈ W, valuation v, agentdenoting term t, variables x and y, we have M, w |= v (x = y) → K t (x = y). Assume M, w |= v (x = y). As variables are rigid this will hold in any world, thus especially those worlds w ′ ∈ W such that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(t w,v ).
Having dealt with all the axioms we turn to show that the rules of inference MP, KG, and Gen preserves validity.
Rules of Inference Preserves Validity
MP:
We have to show that if φ → ψ and φ are valid on F then ψ is valid on F , so assume that |= F φ → ψ and |= F φ. By the latter we see that φ is satisfied in every model based on F , in every world, under every valuation. But then the semantics for → yields that so must ψ be which is what we wanted.
KG:
We have to show that if φ is valid on F then so is K t φ for any agentreferring term t, but this is immediately clear from the semantics for K t .
Gen 
Proof. See above.
We now know, that the logic defined by the syntax presented is included in the logic that follows from the semantic definitions, that is L KT M A,σ ⊆ L F in the language of definitions 14 and 19. What remains is the opposite inclusion which will be the topic of the next section.
Completeness
We start with the most central definition.
Definition 21.
[Completeness] When F is a class of structures (models or frames) and Λ is a logic, we say that Λ is strongly complete wrt. F if for any set Γ of wffs, and φ a single wff, if Λ |= F φ then Γ ⊢ Λ φ. That is, if φ is a semantic consequence of Γ on F then Γ proves φ in Λ.
Based on the proof of soundness one might infer that we should prove completeness by manually show for each valid formula that a proof existed. However, this will not be the strategy. Consider the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.
[IFF] The logic Λ is strongly complete wrt. the class of structures F (models or frames) iff any Λ -consistent set of formulas Γ is satisfiable on some structure from F .
Proof. We first prove that if Λ is complete wrt. F , then every Λ -consistent set of formulas Γ is satisfiable on some structure from F , so assume completeness and pick a Λ-consistent set of formulas Γ ∪ {φ}. If Γ ∪ {φ} is not satisfiable on any structure from F we have Γ |= F ¬φ but then by completeness we get Γ ⊢ Λ ¬φ meaning that Γ ∪ {φ} was Λ-inconsistent after all, a contradiction. Now, we prove that if any Λ -consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on F , then Λ is complete wrt. F . Assume for contradiction that any Λ -consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on F , yet Λ is not complete wrt. F . This means for some set of wffs Γ ∪ {φ} that Γ |= F φ yet Γ ⊢ Λ φ. By the latter it follows that the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent and so by assumption satisfiable on some structure from F , but this contradicts that Γ |= F φ.
What is the significance of Proposition 2? It means essentially that proving completeness is a question of model-hunting, for all we need to do, given a consistent set of formulas, is to produce a model (and a valuation) satisfying that set of formulas. This insight has given rise to a more or less standardized construction of what is called canonical models and this will be the focus of the present inquiry in the following. First, we need to produce a set of worlds.
Worlds of the Canonical Model
Seeing that the overall aim is to produce, given a consistent set of formulas, a model and a valuation satisfying that set of formulas it is natural to let the worlds of the canonical model be sets of consistent formulas subject to appropriate extra conditions. Truth will then be defined as membership. Imagine in the following that a Λ-consistent set Ω of formulas is given, and that our task is to produce a model M Λ Ω from F satisfying Ω. First we bring a couple of important definitions.
Definition 22. [Maximal Λ -Consistent] Let Λ be a logic and Γ a set of wffs. We say that Γ is maximally Λ -consistent if Γ is Λ -consistent and no proper extension of Γ is Λ -consistent.
We shall abbreviate such that we write that Γ is a Λ − M SC whenever Γ is a maximally Λ -consistent set. In order to make the machinery work we need to make sure that whenever a formula of the form ∀xφ is not included in some world of the canonical model there must be some "witness" of the falsity. This motivates the next definition:
Definition 23. [∀ -property] If Γ is a set of formulas, we say that it has the ∀ -property if for every wff φ, for every variable x, there is some variable y such that φ(y/x) → ∀xφ ∈ Γ. Note, that if some set Γ of wffs has the ∀ -property then so will every set of wffs of which Γ is a subset.
What follows from definition 23 is that if for some Λ − M SC Γ φ we have ∀xφ ∈ Γ, then there is some variable y such that φ(y/x) ∈ Γ. This is the reason why the ∀ -property is sometimes referred to as "bearing witness".
For technical reasons we need to enlarge our language in order to make sure our construction will function, and so we add to L A,σ T M infinitely many new variables equally divided between V AR agt and V AR obj . The resulting language is called L + , and note that trivially any wff of L
A,σ
T M is also a wff of L + . Now we need to be better acquainted with Λ − M SC's, and for that we need a Lemma:
Lemma 5. [Completeness Lemma] Let Γ be a consistent set of formulas such that for all formulas φ either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ. Then Γ is deductively closed, that is whenever Γ ⊢ Λ ψ we have ψ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Assume that Γ has the mentioned property, and that for some formula φ we have Γ ⊢ Λ φ. By assumption either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ but the latter contradicts the consistency of Γ.
Lemma 6. [Properties of Λ − M CS's]
If Λ is a logic and Γ is a Λ − M CS, then i) Λ ⊆ Γ ii) for all formulas φ, either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ iii) Γis deductively closed iv) for all formulas φ, ψ : (φ → ψ) ∈ Γ iff ¬φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ Proof. i) If φ ∈ Λ \ Γ then the sets Γ ∪ {φ} and Γ ∪ {¬φ} are both proper extensions of Γand by Lemma 4 one of them is consistent contradicting the maximality of Γ.
ii) Assume for contradiction that for some formula φ neither φ ∈ Γ nor ¬φ ∈ Γ, meaning that both Γ ∪ {φ} and Γ ∪ {¬φ} are proper extensions of Γ. By Lemma 4 one of them is consistent contradicting the maximality of Γ.
iii) By assumption Γ is consistent, and so it follows by ii) and Lemma 5 that Γ is deductively closed. iv) Assume for contradiction that for some formulas φ and ψ we have φ → ψ ∈ Γ yet φ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ Γ yielding { φ → ψ , φ, ¬ψ} ⊆ Γ. By iii) this implies that ψ ∈ Γ by an application of MP, contradicting the consistency of Γ.
The next needed result is the well-known Lindenbaum's Lemma. As the proof is completely standard it will be omitted 9 .
Lemma 7. [Lindenbaum's Lemma] Let Γ be a Λ -consistent set of formulas. Then there exists some
Given a consistent set of formulas Γ we, in accordance with Proposition 2, wish to produce a model and a valuation satisfying Γ. We know by Lemma 7 that we can extend Γ to a maximally consistent set, but Γ is formulated over L
A,σ
T M and the model we are about to build will be formulated over L + so we need to ascertain ourselves that we can find an appropriate set of formulas over L + extending Γ. This is the content of the next Lemma:
Proof. Let Γ be a Λ -consistent set of formulas over L A,σ T M , and observe that L + is countable and as any formula is a finite string of symbols from L + the set of wffs is also countable, meaning that we can enumerate all formulas of the type ∀xφ over L + . Define now a sequence of sets {∆ i } i∈N by
where we take φ to be the n + 1'st formula wrt to the enumeration, and y to be the first variable(again, relative to the enumeration) not to occur in ∆ n nor φ(and note that this a fortiori means that y does not occur free anywhere in neither ∆ n nor φ). The reason why we introduced the enlarged language L + was exactly to ensure that this construction is possible;
T M and only finitely many new variables are introduced in each step we can always pick the variable y ∈ L + . From here the strategy is to show that each ∆ i is consistent and then choose our appropriate set of L + -formulas as Γ + = i∈N ∆ i . We proceed by induction. To establish the induction base simply note that Γ is Λ -consistent by assumption. Now, assume that ∆ n is Λ -consistent while ∆ n+1 is not. This means that for some φ 1 , ..., φ k ∈ ∆ n we have
As y does not occur free in any of the φ i 's we get from the first above and Gen that ⊢ Λ (φ 1 ...φ k ) → ∀yφ(y/x) and since y does not occur free in φ this is equivalent to 10 ⊢ Λ (φ 1 ...φ k ) → ∀xφ(x), but this means that
contradicting the consistency of ∆ n . We conclude that ∆ i is Λ -consistent for every i ∈ N. Put Γ + = i∈N ∆ i and observe that Γ + trivially has the ∀ -property by construction so it remains to show that consistency is "preserved in the limit". For Γ + to be inconsistent there would have to exist some inconsistent, finite subset Γ 0 ⊆ Γ + by definition 18, but any such Γ 0 would be contained in some ∆ i , a contradiction. We conclude that Γ + is Λ -consistent and has the ∀ -property.
Note that the Saturation Lemma does not explicitly ensure preservation of the ∀ -property; this is not necessary as a set of formulas has the ∀ -property if any subset has it. We are almost ready to actually define the canonical model but one more technicality is still pressing. Since variables are rigid and we have included equality in our language we need to make sure that the same equality statements are true in each world in the canonical model. To ensure that this is the case we shall restrict attention to a cohesive subset of the set of worlds which motivates the following definition:
Definition 24. [R -path connected] Given sets X and Y and a map R : Y → P(X × X ) associating binary relations on X to each member of Y, we say that the subset B ⊆ X is R -path connected if for every b, b ′ ∈ B there is a sequence (y 1 , ..., y k ) ⊆ Y, and a sequence
Note that if M is a model, then so is any R -path connected subset M ′ ⊆ M since by definition truth in M ′ cannot depend on worlds in M \ M ′ . We are now ready to define the canonical model for a Λ -consistent set Ω. 
Canonical Models
Dom
Note that we indeed have a partition of the domain by MSD.
is a map associating binary accessibility relations to agents such that (w,
Λ Ω and P some relation symbol with arity
Λ Ω and f some function symbol with arity α let
Before defining the canonical valuation we need to make sure that the canonical model is well-defined. This motivates the following Proposition:
[Canonical Interpretation of Constants] The canonical interpretation does indeed ascribe extensions to all constants in L + , i.e. for all worlds w ∈ W Λ Ω for every constant c ∈ CON there is y ∈ V AR + such that (y = c) ∈ w.
Proof. By the ∀ -property we have for any wff φ and every variable x that there exists a variable y such that φ(y/x) → ∀xφ ∈ w, and we recall that w is deductively closed by Lemma 6. By contraposition this yields ¬∀xφ → ¬φ(y/x) ∈ w and thus by substituting ψ := ¬φ that ¬∀x¬ψ → ¬¬ψ(y/x) ∈ w. Canceling double-negation and abbreviating using ∃ gets us ∃xψ → ψ(y/x) ∈ w. By Id, ∃Id and MP we get ∃xψ ∈ w and thus by another application of MP that ψ(y/x) ∈ w. Putting ψ := (x = c) now yields (y = c) ∈ w as desired 11 .
The only thing left to specify is the canonical valuation:
By construction the domain of the Canonical Model is depending on what equalities between variables are to be found in the Λ − M CS's that constitutes the worlds. As such one might be a little queasy that maybe the occurrence of different such equalities in different worlds might pose incommensurable claims on the cardinality of the domain. That this is not a problem needs to be proven: Proof. This is where we need that W Λ Ω is R Λ -path connected. Assume for x, y ∈ V AR + and world w ∈ W
Furthermore, let the terms t 1 , ..., t k ∈ T erm Λ agt be such that t i designates α Λ i for i = 1, ..., k. As worlds are deductively closed cf. Lemma 6 we get by an application of KG that K t1 (x = y) ∈ w and thus by the definition of R Λ we have (x = y) ∈ w ′ . Repeating this procedure k times yields the desired result.
In the definition of the canonical model we made sure that whenever a formula of the form K t φ where contained in some world w, we had (w, w ′ ) ∈ R Λ (t w,v Λ ) only when φ ∈ w ′ . However, we also need to make sure that the interplay between R Λ and formulas of the type P t φ is appropriate, i.e. if P t φ ∈ w then there must be some
′ . This is the content of the next Proposition:
Proof. The proof is constructive so assume P x φ ∈ w for some world w ∈ W Λ Ω and some variable x with v Λ (x) = α Λ i . The aim is then to produce a world w ′ such that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(α Λ i ) and φ ∈ w ′ . Consider the set Γ = {ψ}∪{φ|K x φ ∈ w}. We first show that Γ is indeed Λ -consistent, so assume otherwise. As {φ|K x φ ∈ w} is consistent this means that there are φ 1 , ..., φ n ∈ {φ | K x φ ∈ w} such that
by KG and two applications of K this yields
Since w is an Λ − M CS containing K x φ i for i = 1, ..., n we can conclude that K x φ 1 ∧ ... ∧ K x φ n ∈ w and thus by MP also K x ¬ψ ∈ w, but by the definition of P x this means that ¬P x ψ ∈ w contradicting the consistency of w. We conclude that the set Γ is indeed Λ -consistent. The idea from here is to construct a sequence of formulas {ψ i } i∈N in a fitting manner such that { i∈N ψ i } ∪ {φ | K x φ ∈ w} is a Λ -consistent set with the ∀ -property that can be extended by Lindenbaum's Lemma to an Λ − M CS with the required properties. To define the sequence {ψ i } i∈N we first define a couple of enumerations; first we enumerate all formulas of the type ∀yλ, and then letting ∀yλ be the n + 1'th such formula we define the sequence {ψ i } i∈N inductively by ψ 0 = ψ (from Γ) and ψ n+1 = ψ n ∧ {λ(z/y) → ∀yλ} where z = x is a variable such that {φ | K x φ ∈ w} ∪ ψ n ∧ {λ(z/y) → ∀yλ} is consistent. That it is always possible to choose such variable z is now shown: Assume that {ψ n }∪{φ|K x φ ∈ w} is consistent and assume for contradiction that {φ|K x φ ∈ w}∪ ψ n ∧{λ(z/y) → ∀yλ} is inconsistent for every variable z of L + . This means that for every variable z we could find {χ 1 , ..., χ n } ⊆ {φ | K x φ ∈ w} such that
which by standard logic is equivalent to
and by Lemma 3 we get
further, by Lemma 2 we get
Seeing that {χ 1 , ..., χ n } ⊆ w by definition we get by Lemma 6 that K x χ n ∧ ... ∧ K x χ n ⊆ w and thus by an application of MP that K x ψ n → {λ(z/y) ∧ ¬∀yλ} ⊆ w for every variable z of the language. Now, if z = x is some variable occurring in neither λ nor ψ n we consider the formula
and see that by the ∀ -property the formula there is some variable z ′ such that
But we just showed that K x ψ n → {λ(z/y) ∧ ¬∀yλ} ⊆ w for every z ∈ V AR + and so by an application of MP we obtain ∀zK x ψ n → ¬(λ(z/y) → ∀yλ) ∈ w.
Furthermore, as x = z we see that
is an instance of BF and so included in w. An application of MP yields K x ∀z ψ n → ¬(λ(z/y) → ∀yλ) ∈ w and utilizing that whenever x does not occur free in φ, ∀x(φ → ψ) → (φ → ∀xψ) is a Theorem of first-order logic 12 we obtain that
since by assumption z does not occur (free) in ψ n . Recall that whenever y is not free in ∀xφ, ∃x φ(y/x) → ∀xφ is a Theorem of first-order logic, from which we get ∃z λ(z/y) → ∀yλ .
Seeing that 1 can be re-written as K x ψ n → ¬∃z λ(z/y) → ∀yλ ∈ w we conclude that K x ¬ψ n ∈ w contradicting the consistency of {ψ n }∪{φ|K x φ ∈ w}. We conclude that it is indeed possible to choose z = x such that
is Λ -consistent. Now, consider the set {φ | K x φ ∈ w} ∪ { n∈N ψ n }. First, for all n, {φ | K x φ ∈ w} ∪ {ψ n } is consistent by the above. Second, we see that ⊢ Λ ψ n → ψ m for all n ≥ m such that {φ | K x φ ∈ w} ∪ { n∈N ψ n } is consistent too. Further, by construction the set has the ∀ -property, and so can be extended to an Λ − M CS by Lindenbaum -call this set w ′ . This is the world we set out to produce; by construction φ ∈ w ′ and so we have by definition that (w,
Having secured the needed-in-a-second existence-result another worry presents itself; for if K x φ ∈ w for some world w, some wff φ, and some agent-referring variable x yet for some variable y designating the same agent as x we had K y φ / ∈w we have a problem. To see this note that by Lemma 6 that ¬K y φ ∈ w or equivalently P y ¬φ ∈ w, but by the Proposition just proved we have a world w ′ such that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R Λ (y w,v Λ ) and ¬φ ∈ w ′ contradicting the assumption that K x φ ∈ w. That this does not obtain is the content of the next Proposition: Λ Ω , hence a fortiori (x = y) ∈ w. By PS we get
and thus by MP that K x φ → K y φ ∈ w. By assumption we have K x φ ∈ w and so one more application of MP yields K y φ ∈ w as desired.
Obviously, the idea is that "truth is membership" in the canonical model, and we are now in position to prove that this is exactly the case.
As the proof of the truth Lemma will be by induction of the complexity of φ we need to make this notion precise first. . Now, by the definition of extensions in the canonical model this is the case iff for some x ∈ V AR + we have t
iff (t 1 = x) ∈ w and (t 2 = x) ∈ w and as w is deductively closed (t 1 = t 2 ) ∈ w as desired.
Atomic Formulas: Let P be a predicate symbol of arity β ∈ σ Λ and t 1 , ..., t k ∈ T erm + such that t i is of sort
Λ (P, w) which in turn holds iff P (x 1 , ..., x k ) ∈ w and as by assumption (t i = x i ) ∈ w for i = 1, ..., k this is equivalent to P (t 1 , ..., t k ) ∈ w by deductive closedness.
Negation: Assume the truth Lemma for a wff φ, then we have
∈ w by the induction hypothesis. By 6 we get ¬φ ∈ w as desired.
Implication: Assume the truth Lemma for wffs φ, ψ. Then we have M
Ω , w |= v Λ ψ which in turn holds iff either ¬φ ∈ w or ψ ∈ w by the induction hypothesis. Then Lemma 6 yields φ → ψ ∈ w as desired.
Which brings us to the main result: Theorem 2. [Canonical Class Theorem] Let Λ be a normal two-sorted termmodal logic. Then Λ is complete wrt. the class M Λ of canonical models for Λ.
Proof. By Proposition 2 proving completeness of Λ wrt. M Λ is simply a question of, given some Λ -consistent set Ω, producing some element in M Λ on which Ω is satisfied. By Lemmas 7 and 8 we can extend Ω to an Λ − M CS w with the ∀ -property, and we can find a model M
Λ Ω which by Lemma 9 gives that M Λ Ω , w |= v Λ Ω . As this holds for every Λ -consistent set Ω we conclude that Λ is complete wrt. the class M Λ of canonical models.
A corollary of this is that 
Applications of the Canonical Class Theorem
In this section applications of the Canonical Class Theorem will be explored, and soundness and completeness for the term-modal version of S4 will be proved. It is a fact from standard modal logic that the axioms T (i.e. ∀x K x φ → φ ), 5 (i.e. ∀x P x φ → K x P x φ ) and 4 (i.e. ∀x K x φ → K x K x φ ) characterizes the class of reflexive, euclidian, and transitive frames respectively (cf. [1, pp. 128] ) and the appropriate term-modal version of these results will now be stated and proved.
Lemma 10. [Axiom T ] Let x be any agent-referring variable, and φ any wff of L A,σ T M . The axiom ∀x K x φ → φ characterizes the class of frames in which R(α) is reflexive for all α ∈ A.
Proof. Recall that a relation R on a set W is reflexive iff for all w ∈ W we have that wRw. We show first that if for some frame F = W, R, DOM ,R(α) is reflexive for all α ∈ A then the axiom ∀K x φ → φ is valid on F for any agentreferring variable x. Fix some agent-referring variable x, world w ∈ W, and wff φ.
Assume further that R(x w,v ) is reflexive. It suffices to show that M, w |= K x φ → φ by surjectivity of valutions, so assume M, w |= K x φ. By reflexivity we have (w, w) ∈ R(x w,v ) and so by the semantics for K x that M, w |= φ as desired. The converse is shown by contraposition: Assume R(α) is non-reflexive for some agent α ∈ A, i.e. for some world w ∈ W we have (w, w) / ∈ R(α). Now we can pick the interpretation such that for the resulting model M, we have M, w |= φ while for all w ′ ∈ W \ {w} we have M, w ′ |= φ. By the semantics of K x we get that M, w |= K x φ yet M, w |= φ.
Lemma 11. [Axiom 5] Let x be any agent-referring variable, and φ any wff of L A,σ T M . The axiom ∀x P x φ → K x P x φ characterizes the class of frames in which R(α) is euclidian for all α ∈ A.
Proof. Recall that a relation R on a set W is euclidian iff.
for all v, u, w ∈ W if uRv and uRw then vRw. We show first that if for some frame F = W, R, DOM ,R(α) is euclidian for all α ∈ A then the axiom ∀x P x φ → K x P x φ is valid on F for any agent-referring variable x, so fix some agent-referring variable x, world w ∈ W, and any wff φ. Assume further that R(x w,v ) is euclidian and see that it suffices to show that M, w |= P x φ → K x P x φ, so assume M, w |= P x φ. By assumption there is w ′ ∈ W such that M, w ′ |= φ. If w ′ is the only world accessible from w we have by definition that M, w |= K x P x φ so assume otherwise, i.e. there is some u = w ′ ∈ W s.t (w, u) ∈ R(x w,v ). As R(x w,v ) is euclidian we get that (u, w ′ ) ∈ R(x w,v ) and thus M, u |= P x φ and then M, w |= K x P x φ as desired. The converse is shown by contraposition, so let R(α) is non-euclidian for some agent α ∈ A, i.e. for worlds w, v, u ∈ W we have (w, v) ∈ R(α) and (w, u) ∈ R(α) while (v, u) / ∈ R(α). We can now choose our interpretation such that in the resulting model M, we have M, v |= φ yet M, w |= φ for every w ∈ W \ {v}. Now, M, w |= P x φ yet M, w |= K x P x φ as desired. Proof. Recall that a relation R on a set W is transitive iff.
for all v, u, w ∈ W if vRu and uRw then vRw. We show first that if for some frame F = W, R, DOM ,R(α) is transitive for all α ∈ A then the axiom ∀x K x φ → K x K x φ is valid on F for any agent-referring variable x, so fix some agent-referring variable x, world w ∈ W, and any wff φ, and see that it suffices to show that M, w |= K x φ → K x K x φ, so assume M, w |= P x φ. If v, u ∈ W is such that (w, v) ∈ R(α) and (v, u) ∈ R(α) we have by transitivity that (w, u) ∈ R(α) and thus by assumption that M, u |= φ, such that M, v |= K x φ meaning that M, w |= K x K x φ as desired. The converse is shown by contraposition, so let R(α) be non-transitive for some agent α ∈ A, i.e. for worlds w, v, u ∈ W we have (w, v) ∈ R(α) axiom in [3] reads K a p → K a K a p 13 . Further, Hintikka insists that the agent whom is referred to by a must know who he is for the axiom to make sense, and formalizes this demand as ∃xK a (x = a) 14 . As it turns out, if interpreted in the framework presented here, there is a rather nice motivation for taking the axiom ∃xK a (x = a) as necessary for K a p → K a K a p for assume we evaluate the latter over the class of transitive frames; it turns out that the axiom is not even valid.
Proposition 7.
[K a p → K a K a p is not valid on the class of transitive T M σ Aframes] Let a be any agent-referring constant. Then, the formula K a p → K a K a p is not valid over the class of transitive T M σ A -frames. Proof. We show the Proposition by constructing a counter-example. Choose some model M, some world w in the class of transitive T M σ A -frames, some wff φ, a valuation v, and some agent-referring constant a such that M, w |= v K a φ. It is certainly possible to choose the above such that for some world w ′ we have (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(a w,v ). Now, since constants are non-rigid we can even choose the interpretation such that I(a, w) = I(a, w ′ ), and thus if t is yet another world such that (w ′ , t) ∈ R(a w',v ) we do not have by transitivity that (w, t) ∈ R(a w,v ). We can even choose our model such that M, t |= v φ, yielding M, w ′ |= v K a φ and subsequently M, w |= v K a K a φ.
Comparing the above Proposition with the proof of Lemma 12 we see that, unsurprisingly, what goes wrong is an effect of the non-rigidity of constants. In plain English we do not know, that the referent of a is the same in all worlds and that enables us to construct a counter example. What would be the effect of adding Hintikka's "Knowing who" -axiom ∃xK a (x = a)? Take world w, a valuation v, and model M from the proof of Proposition 7 and assume ∃xK a (x = a) as an axiom. Now, as M, w |= v ∃xK a (x = a) we get by the definition of ∃ that M, w |= v ¬∀x¬K a (x = a) and thus by the semantics of ∀ that M, w |= v ′ K a (x = a) for some x -variant v ′ of v. By the semantics of K a we get for any world w ′ with (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(a ′ is a world such that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R(a w,v ) we get M, w ′ |= v p and if t is yet another world such that (w ′ , t) ∈ R(a w ′ ,v ) we make the observation that 13 I will not go into Hintikka's semantics which differs from the kripkean semantics employed throughout the present work.
14 Again, this is formally a translation from Hintikka's framework into the framework developed here. However, it seems rather harmless.
R(a w,v ) = R(a w ′ ,v ). By transitivity this yields (w, t) ∈ R(a w,v ) and then by assumption M, t |= v p which in turn implies M, w ′ |= K a p and M, w |= K a K a p as desired.
Hintikka's motivation for demanding the "Knowing Who" -axiom as prerequisite for his version of the axiom 4 is quiet different than the above sketched, but internal to the Kripkean framework employed here Propositions 7 and 8 offers separate justification.
Conclusion
I have stated language and syntax for a two-sorted term-modal logic. I have presented an axiomatic system for the logic K T M A,σ , and shown it to be both sound and complete wrt. the class of all T M σ A -frames. Then I have added the "term-modal" version of axiom 4 and shown the logic T M σ .K4 to be both sound and complete wrt. the class of transitive T M σ A -frames. Lastly, I have discussed the version of axiom 4 that Hintikka puts forward in [3] , and suggested a motivation for presupposing the "Knowing Who" -axiom in a Kripkean framework.
